The Institute of Development Studies is one of the world's leading organisations for research, teaching and communications on international development. Founded in 1966, the Institute enjoys an international reputation based on the quality of its work and the rigour with which it applies academic skills to real world challenges. Its purpose is to understand and explain the world, and to try to change it -to influence as well as to inform.
1 A chronology of BRAC's global expansion 15 Table 2 .2 A rough typology of 'Southern' international NGOs 20 As the British media uses the term, an 'aid worker' refers to an employee of Oxfam, Save the Children or a similarly recognisable brand of international nongovernmental organisation (NGO), usually working in emergency contexts in poor countries, and typically European (or English-speaking and white). The kidnapping of an aid worker in Afghanistan in 2007 was resoundingly ignored by the international press, even though the kidnappings of German, Danish, Italian, Canadian and French journalists and aid workers in the same year had been closely covered. The difference for Nurul Islam was that he works for BRAC. 1 And BRAC is not (yet) a recognisable brand of international non-governmental organisation; its staff are neither European, English-speaking nor white.
The issue of national origins, as well as matters of race and culture, are relevant to the story this paper tries to tell. These are not matters that development studies centrally addresses, despite their intrinsic significance in the cross-cultural, racially-charged face-to-face encounter that marks the development intervention. 2 But this paper also covers more conventional terrain of development management, poverty reduction models, finance, scaling up and impact. At the core of the paper is an attempt to grapple with how the unfamiliar issues of national origins, culture and race interact with these more tractable matters of development NGO interventions. It is motivated by the jarring sensation created by BRAC's expansion to other poor developing countries since the 2000s: if Nurul Islam challenges notions of 'aid workers', BRAC more generally challenges development theories of NGOs and civil society.
The purpose of this paper is to offer an account of BRAC's global expansion, a process underway since the 2000s, and to reflect on what this expansion may tell us about new directions in aid and development practice. The 'challenge' of the title is twofold. First, are the challenges faced by BRAC as it seeks to expand its activities to new countries. 3 The account discusses the new kinds of aid and development relationships that might, possibly, be engendered by the interesting fact of BRAC's Southern origins, as well as the challenges this brings. It also considers the managerial challenges of transplanting managerial systems across contexts, and the impact of the aid regime in the new countries. The second 1 An account of the kidnapping of Nurul Islam (written as 'Noor Islam') is given in Smillie (2009: chapter 19) .
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Exceptions include Sarah White's pioneering work on race in development. See also Eyben on aid and relationships (2006) .
3
There are now eight programme countries, in chronological order: Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Tanzania, Pakistan, southern Sudan, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Haiti is being discussed as the next country, and a BRAC programme to tackle extreme poverty is already being replicated there. There are also plans for BRAC UK to work in the UK with Tower Hamlets council in east London, on an initiative to employ community health-workers (along the lines of BRAC's Shasthya Shebika model) (Sandra Kabir, interview, June 2009).
challenge is, perhaps, to current thinking about NGOs and development. The paper discusses BRAC's expansion in light of disappointment with NGO performance in terms of delivering development 'alternatives', framed in one recent account as NGOs having 'hit a wall ' (Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin 2008) . While the NGO literature offers some entry points for the analysis of the BRAC case, there is little there to direct attention to the core distinctive aspect of BRAC's expansion: that it is a Southern organisation from a poor country expanding to other poor Southern countries. BRAC may be another instance of the South in the South -a transfer of development knowledge, technology or resources across and between poor countries; it may be a relationship to which Northern institutions and actors are secondary, other than as providers of finance. The many important and interesting dimensions to South-South transfers -as the growing literature on Chinese aid and investment in Africa demonstrates (Rohan and Power 2008) have yet to be addressed in the NGO literature, most likely because this is such a new development within the NGO world.
The paper is in four parts. The introductory section outlines the approach taken to exploring these issues. The second section gives a brief account of BRAC's global expansion, discussing whether this marks a trend, and how BRAC International differs from other international NGOs. This section also offers an analysis of the elements of the BRAC approach that enabled it to achieve the scale it did in Bangladesh. The third section looks in some more detail at the challenges BRAC has faced in its expansion, reviewing these in light of some debates about NGOs in development. Section four concludes.
Approach, positionality and limitations
This paper was intended to be exploratory, and was motivated by the sense that there was something interesting and new about BRAC's global expansion, and an inability to pinpoint precisely what this was. This means the paper opens up more lines of inquiry than it is able to address, much space necessarily being devoted to documenting the facts of the case. Part of the appeal of the subject is that it forces 'attention to detail and the specifics of power, history and context', as we witness BRAC's attempts to transplant its programmes, honed in one particular set of power relations, histories and contexts to an entirely new setting (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 2006: 670) . The paper could have continued in a tradition of NGO research by focusing very tightly on the organisational dynamics of growth; instead, the paper brings into focus the policy and political context, including relations between donors, the state and NGOs (Tvedt 2002 (Tvedt : 2006 .
The NGO and civil society literature suggested two areas as of specific relevance. The first was a strong sense of disappointment among scholars and critical civil society practitioners with the performance of NGOs as 'alternatives ' (Bebbington et al. 2008) ; in their volume, Bebbington et al. use the exact imagery of having 'hit a wall', even while acknowledging that many NGOs still struggle and negotiate to persist with alternative, transformational development strategies. This sense of disappointment is echoed in a shift in donor interest away from civil society in the 2000s (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 2006) . This shift reflects some disappointment with respect to the impact of aid to NGOs, as well as the rise of the security agenda, which has meant reduced support for the liberal human rights agendas of civil society in developing countries (Howell et al. 2008) .
The second issue is, broadly, that of NGO 'transnationality'. This includes insights into how the emergence of 'global civil society' has re-shaped the role of NGOs within international development discourse (Townsend 1999). Mawdsley et al. document the surprising rapidity and ease of transfer of ideas and language across NGOs in the south (2002). It seems possible that 'transnationality' has supported -and perhaps motivated -BRAC's expansionary project. There is some reference also to the phenomenon this paper aims to explore -that of Southern organisations expanding their activities internationally (Bebbington et al. 2008; Hulme 2008) .
Transnationality is certainly relevant to the BRAC story, particularly if, as seems to be the case, BRAC is merely an unusually large and prominent example of a trend for ideas, technologies and resources to be transferred between Southern countries. It is less easy to see how a story of disappointment around the role of NGOs can apply to the present BRAC strategy; alternatively, it could be asked whether BRAC has succeeded in breaking through the wall of NGO incapacity. If so, why?
To tackle this question it is necessary to revisit, briefly, the question of BRAC's 'success'. It is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake a meaningful analysis of impacts on income poverty, health and education, or of how their interventions have shaped accountability in public service delivery. Overall, the paper avoids a strongly normative position on the question of 'success' in this sense; in this it hopes to avoid what Tvedt has roundly criticised as 'a history of NGO activism, producing ideology in favour ' of NGOs (2006: 679) . Instead, the paper concentrates on the question of why BRAC achieved what it has. This entails a focus on management, including the management of expansion, and learning and innovation, but also takes into account the issue of political space, which is always in effect an issue for BRAC because of the sheer size of its ambitions. This paper was motivated by the desire to tell -and explore -a story of change in the real world on which to date no narrative structure or theoretical construct had been imposed. It is, nevertheless, a partial account in two senses. First, there is limited documentary evidence on BRAC's global programmes to date. 4 This partly reflects the fact of BRAC's unusual structure, size and orientation, and that, therefore, it merits being treated as a unique outcome of its particular historical and personal circumstances, rather than as a 'hybrid' type of organisation, a treatment that would contribute to learning from its 'positive deviance', instead of trying to pigeonhole it within a pre-set managerial category (Biggs and Lewis 2009 ). But perhaps because there has been so little attention to the issue, no independent critical literature on the specific issue of BRAC's international programmes could be identified.
Second, the authors of the paper are both partial insiders to BRAC, as well as Bengalis. This predisposes both authors towards appreciation of the achievements of this Bengali-origin organisation. It also afforded the authors some insights from the position of having worked in the organisation, which permitted more first-hand experience of the constraints and rewards of the organisation than any amount of survey work could generate. This positions the research within a 'tradition' of close identification with the NGO being researched; while the present paper may not have entirely avoided the pitfalls of 'over-identification' with the NGO concerned, it is approached from a reflective awareness of our own biases (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 2006: 670 'come and help us', governments coming and telling us... 9 The use of the language of 'social enterprise' is problematic, including that some of its dominant usages are distinctively different from the sense offered in the quotation above. BRAC does not, for instance, engage in 'social business', but sees 'profits' as reserves for growth. Similarly, its development projects are not the projects of corporate social responsibility, but its core 'business'. 10 The Afghanistan programme was considered a success, and by 2006, BRAC was reportedly one of the largest NGOs in the country. Four key lessons were drawn from this experience, as documented by some of the key actors in BRAC senior management at the time:
1 South-South collaboration worked, and that motivated, experienced Bangladeshi development professionals could work successfully with trained local staff to deliver a rapid programme expansion.
2 The basic elements of the BRAC development model worked and could be replicated, once adapted to local conditions. In Afghanistan, schools had to be for girls only, and the costs of delivering services were higher.
3 The value assigned to a philosophy of scale, to 'serve as many people as possible', has been important for staff motivation. Table 2 .1 A chronology of BRAC's global expansion).
BRAC's global expansion has its critics; perhaps because this process is not yet very widely known, these have to date mainly been friendly critics. One criticism that has been heard since the early period of expansion is that not only is there still room for BRAC to further its work in Bangladesh, going global jeopardises the management of both the home country programme and the new programmes, as senior staff become increasingly over-stretched. There certainly seems to be truth in the charge that management is stretched, and it is recognised within the organisation. But rapid scaling up also tested the management capacities of BRAC Bangladesh; to some extent, there seems to be a calculated risk that no lasting damage will be done from the rapid extension to new contexts of the responsibilities of senior managers.
While it remains too early to consider the question of the success or otherwise of BRAC's global adventure, it seems clear that parts of the Africa programme have created new challenges, which are absorbing a great deal of senior management energy and time. One is that resources have proven to be a constraint, or at least not being generated as fast to keep pace with BRAC's absorptive capacities.
Ongoing conflict and security threats in Afghanistan and Southern Sudan have created significant difficulties for programmes and particularly staff in Afghanistan. However, the BRAC expansion continues apace; new country programmes are scaling up, new funding is being sought, and approaches are being experimented with, some to be discarded, others retained. The Alternative Livelihood Rural Finance Programme (ALREP) is also set up to create counter the problem of opium cultivation.
Infrastructure and Social Development Programme (ISDP) is set up. The first project -National Solidarity Programme (NSP) in six provinces is set up to assist the Government in strengthening governance at the local community level.
July

Educational Programme is started in Afghanistan 2002
Basic Education for Older Children (BEOC) BRAC also establishes Microfinance Programmes in Tanzania.
The Essential Health Care (EHC) Programme is set up in Tanzania to provide primary health care services to their microfinance members, their families and wider communitiesfocusing on Malaria, Tuberculosis (TB) and HIV/AIDS, the reduction of infant and under-five mortality rates, increasing access to healthcare services and improving utilisation of government health services.
As a part of the health programmes in Tanzania, modelled on the Shastha Shevika Model in Bangladesh, women from Microfinance groups are trained to become Community Health Promoters (CHPs).
March
BRAC starts the Agriculture, Livestock and Poultry Programme in 2007
Tanzania. The programme operates through trained agricultural extention farmers and model crop farmers, who are female volunteers from microfinance groups to help other farmers.
April
BRAC takes a historical step by signing the memorandum of 2007
understanding with the Government of Pakistan to set up programmes in microfinance, education and health in two provinces -Punjab and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).
May 2007 BRAC starts a microfinance programme in Southern Sudan, based on the success of its model in neighbouring countries, Uganda and Tanzania. The solid organisational base in Uganda helps to establish its operations smoothly.
July
BRAC USA is officially registered as an independent, non-profit 2007 organisation is the USA, for increasing visibility about BRAC's successful community development model in the global North, mobilising resources and building business partnerships.
The Essential Health Care (EHC) Programme is launched in Uganda.
As a part of the health programmes in Uganda, based on the successful replication of the Shastha Shevika Model in Tanzania, women from microfinance groups are trained to become Community Health Promoters (CHPs).
August
BRAC sets up 10 offices in NWFP in Pakistan for the microfinance 2007 programme.
2008
Launches an Essential Health Care Programme (EHC) in Southern Sudan, based on the similar model in Uganda and Tanzania.
As a part of the health programmes in Southern Sudan, women from microfinance groups are trained to become Community Health Volunteers (CHVs).
The Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescent (ELA) Programme, aimed at teenage girls, is launched in Uganda and Tanzania, based on its successful implementation in Bangladesh. This programme focuses on providing incomegeneration skills and life skills training, and creating opportunities for earning their living. This is operated through peer groups called adolescent development clubs, assisted by microfinance groups.
A regional Research and Evaluation Unit for Africa is established in Kampala, Uganda.
BRAC signs a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Uganda's Vice-President's office, reiterating BRAC's role and involvement in the Bonna Bagaggawale (Prosperity for All) initiatives for eradicating poverty.
April
BRAC launches its own Education Programme in Southern 2008
Sudan, with the aim of opening of 1,000 non-formal primary schools within five years.
As an extension of 'microfinance plus'* approach, a pilot agriculture programme is launched in Southern Sudan, while funding is being secured for a greater Agriculture, Livestock and Poultry Programme. 
'Southern' international NGOs: a growing trend?
One possibility that this paper aimed to explore was that the internationalisation of NGOs of Southern origin marked a growing trend of which BRAC is merely one example. This proved to be difficult to verify, but there are signs of a trend.
South-South development organisational expansion
BRAC is not the first such example of a South-South transfer of a development intervention model; the Grameen Bank replication model (through the Grameen Trust and the Grameen Fund) means that it is not even the first example of an organisation of Bangladeshi origin to have transmitted its knowledge, technology and resources to other Southern countries. But this is an example of what David Hulme has called 'institution breeding' as distinct from organisational expansion (Hulme 1990) . 11 Among Bangladeshi microfinance institutions (MFIs), ASA has also been developing a replication system internationally, including through technical assistance to some 17 developing countries and the global MFI network being built by ASA International (a limited liability company registered in Mauritius) in Sri Lanka, India, the Philippines, Ghana and Nigeria, with plans to expand to Pakistan, Nepal, Yemen, Indonesia and Afghanistan. 12 Global microfinance networks have been particularly effective vehicles for spreading service provision models developed and refined in poor countries across other poor countries, through networks such as FINCA (Foundation for International Community Assistance) (whose founder is North American).
Table 2.2 A rough typology of 'Southern' international NGOs
While BRAC is not the first Southern organisation to transfer knowledge or resources to other countries in the South, evidence to support the idea of a trend is not readily available. See Table 2 .2 for an initial attempt at typologising Southern international NGOs. Within the microfinance world BRAC's Southern expansion is unremarkable, because global replication programmes are an established feature of the industry. However, these programmes are often minimalist 'build-operate-transfer' or technical assistance models, 13 and do not involve the transfer of full-scale management systems and organisational culture, including trained personnel. BRAC's activity is distinct from other global microfinance networks in that:
Unlike the Grameen replication programme, it has not replicated a technology or a model through partner institutions (although the BRAC Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction (CFPR) programme is also doing that), but through the creation of entirely new organisations. In fact, one explanation for BRAC's organisational expansion is that it had a somewhat dissatisfactory experience with the provision of technical assistance (TA) to a UNICEF project in Southern Sudan on non-formal education; it was felt then that they might not have been very good at providing TA, and could do a great deal Unlike the FINCA network, the origins of BRAC, including its founder and senior management, are Southern. As will be discussed below, the personal characteristics, including the national origins of staff, have some significance for their relationships.
Unlike most microfinance networks, the expansion has involved a wide range of development interventions, at least some of which emerge from in-country (donor, government or other) demand. This entails that the BRAC expansion is more significant and complex than the neat sharing of the spare, elegant, globally tested microfinance models. 14 The BRAC model is increasingly being promoted under the rubric 'Microfinance Plus'. BRAC's global expansion, while strongly focused on microfinance, is far from an example of a pure microfinance institution internationalising its model.
BRAC's global expansion has entailed an organisational expansion, with all the attendant complexities and scaling up of management, human resources, monitoring, research and evaluation that implies.
How BRAC differs from other international NGOs
In organisational terms, BRAC's international expansion resembles what happens when a Northern NGO (an Oxfam, HelpAge International, Plan International etc) expands into new countries, with two caveats. First, international NGOs increasingly work through local partners, rather than seeking to set up their own frontline service provision (Mawdsley et al. 2002) . This has inevitably led to concerns that the relationship between local and Northern international NGOs has recreated the negative, power-laden dimensions of donor-recipient relations (Bebbington et al. 2008 ). BRAC's strategy is to create entire new frontline organisations in the new countries, rather than to act as brokers for international aid. Such a strategy is hardly problem-free; the numbers of Bangladeshi staff in the international programmes are small, but it is proving hard to retain good local staff in the new countries. Bangladeshis are still being recruited to work in other country programmes; this includes some freshly-recruited staff from Bangladesh, who therefore cannot be presumed to bring the experience which could arguably be claimed as a core component of their advantage in the service delivery market.
A second difference between BRAC and other international NGOs is that many of the latter have moved away from direct service delivery towards 'strategic' high-end policy or rights-based advocacy work since the 1990s. While the rationale, particularly the pursuit of rights-based and pro-poor policy agendas through 'civil society' type pressure activities, may have been sound, the withdrawal from frontline services -from 'doing development' -arguably comes at some costs to organisational access to people's realities, and therefore organisational capacities to effect a significant difference. A relevant difference between BRAC and other international NGOs here is that BRAC's headquarters are in the same country as their biggest programme, which does not seem to be the case for other international development NGOs. 15 It is with respect to the issue of the scale and ambition of their field activitiestheir service delivery -that BRAC management sees the sharpest distinction between its own international programme and those of other international NGOs.
In the view of BRAC senior managers, BRAC International is more ambitious than other international NGOs. Some BRAC staff jokingly criticise INGOs as having 'flag-planting' tendencies, by which they mean that country programmes enable organisations to demonstrate that they 'work in X country', but these are in fact so modest in scale and ambition -'small and beautiful', as Mr Abed ironically described them -as to be able to effect a very small difference for very few people.
It is interesting that in their expansionary move, BRAC did not appear to have considered that in other countries, there may be less space for NGO service delivery, national or international. In interviews with F.H. Abed and Imran Matin, it seemed that the possibility of resistance to NGOs delivering services, for example on grounds of undermining state accountability, had not been fully considered. The situation is different for global microfinance networks, but these appear to have become increasingly distanced from international NGO concerns, perhaps partly in response to new relationships to private sector sources of funding.
It is not that BRAC did not have to work to carve out the space for its programmes in Bangladesh. The joke is that BRAC is 'second government' -a half-admiring dig at BRAC's relentless expansion and diversification. But within BRAC, and among some who have directly observed the effects of their services on public service delivery, there is a belief that these have complemented government efforts through partnerships, 'demonstration effects', serving areas and groups government cannot or will not; possibly also, through competitive pressures on government to expand access to its services (mainly primary education). 16 In this context it is interesting to consider how BRAC's global expansion may have been affected by the Paris Agenda. BRAC's experience to date appears to suggest that bilateral aid has been less easily available than had been expected, based on the Bangladesh and Afghanistan experiences. This is substantially because of budget support and sector wide programmes, but also because there is less space for NGO service delivery in these new countries than in Bangladesh, always with the caveat of post-conflict zones in which there is more space for effective service delivery organisations. BRAC International may, then, be spearheading a trend towards the internationalisation of Southern NGO activity which is distinct from, and more extensive than the global MFI networks that have to date dominated the space for South-South development transfers. But there are as yet no close competitors. In its own language, BRAC is confident about its own unique position, a confidence which appears to be based on fundraising achievements to date:
With the success of BRAC USA and BRAC UK, BRAC will be the world's first international development organization initiated and led by people from the developing world with solidarity and support from the developed world. 
How BRAC scaled up: the Bangladesh story
The story of BRAC going global makes most sense with some understanding of the scale of BRAC operations in Bangladesh, and the factors behind its expansion nationally. This section will sketch BRAC's history in Bangladesh; readers who require more information may refer to more detailed accounts of BRAC's Bangladesh programme. 17 It should be noted that while BRAC is the largest, there are a number of other big Bangladeshi NGOs, many of which have 'scaled up' for reasons and in ways that resemble that of BRAC, and were enabled by similar factors, particularly the political space and availability of aid (see Zaman 2004 for an account of the scaling up of microfinance in Bangladesh).
BRAC was founded in the war-torn newly independent Bangladesh in 1972, initially as a committee of volunteers trying to contribute to rehabilitation among returning refugees in Sulla in Sylhet district. In the 37 years since its modest beginnings, BRAC has expanded and diversified into a large, complex organisation, covering all 64 districts of the country. The scale and complexity of its operations within Bangladesh make it difficult to capture; Box 2 summarises key highlights in its history.
BRAC currently frames its core approach as 'microfinance plus'. This means that BRAC provides credit and savings facilities, the returns from which support its other social mission. A key feature of this support is the physical infrastructure, human resources and managerial functions the microfinance office can provide. BRAC is by no means the lean credit machine that ASA, for example, has perfected. While there is a Fordist aspect to BRAC, in its homogeneous frontline offices and multi-level monitoring systems, it is a messier and more complex organisation than 'pure' microfinance institutions like ASA. This messiness and complexity arises from the layering on to the basic microfinance platform a wide range of social services: livelihoods training; formal and non-formal, pre-, primary, secondary and higher education; sanitation and public health education; primary health care services; rights and legal education, legal aid, and institution-building and coalition-building. It has a large, complex programme for the ultra poor, which aims to tackle the multiple dimensions of the most severe forms of deprivation. Through its commercial activities BRAC provides backward linkages to agricultural inputs and forward linkages with markets. BRAC operates a commercial bank, initially with a small and medium enterprise (SME) focus, but now a widening range of products, including migrant remittance services.
BRAC started developing profit-making enterprises in support of its social mission early on (see Table 2 .3). The dairy plant, for instance, was established in order to process and retail milk products from members' cows purchased using microcredit. 18 BRAC appears to have been moderately effective at generating profits and recycling surpluses in support of its social mission (World Bank 2006). One study concluded that equity considerations were central to BRAC's enterprises, and that these 'often set a price floor even when market conditions change' to protect poor producers; this market distortion 'is justified on equity grounds, given the organization's overall poverty reduction mandate' (cited in World Bank 2006: 55). Widespread criticism has extended to legal challenges to BRAC Bank (ultimately over-ruled by the courts), and includes the implications for reputation, competition and commercial viability:
Relative to other NGOs, BRAC's significantly large portfolio is a manifestation of top management's corporate and business background, a conviction that such deviation from social development efforts is desirable both for the organization and society at large, and the belief that it will contribute to sustainability... A closer look at [BRAC businesses'] financial data suggests that their returns are only modest... The challenge of deficit financing, and in many cases exiting the market, is an important consideration that cannot be overlooked by NGOs contemplating business ventures. What also cannot be eschewed is the perception among many stakeholders that BRAC's wholesome image of an institution representing the poor, and an innovator in social development and empowerment, has been compromised. BRAC and others have deviated from their core objectives by involving themselves in business operations, which may undermine their acceptability and effectiveness, many allege.
(Verulam Associates 2005)
While the financial returns from BRAC's market ventures are limited and may contribute little directly to financing its social mission, profits from its microfinance programme are used to subsidise 'soft' and smaller sized loans for poorer people.
In the mid-2000s it was estimated that BRAC loans were on average 40 per cent smaller than those of ASA (World Bank 2006), and a higher proportion were reaching the very poor (Verulam Associates 2005: 29). BRAC's for-profit activities are relevant for its current move towards reframing its role as that of 'social enterprise' (see Table 2 .3 -A chronology of BRAC in Bangladesh). A more recent arena of growth has been civil society activism, through the establishment of the BRAC Advocacy and Human Rights Unit in 2002 and BRAC University and its associated research institutes. 19 Compared to other NGOs, including many international NGOs operating within Bangladesh, it is uncontroversial to argue that BRAC has to date been less prominent with respect to civil society advocacy, particularly around good governance issues, than might be expected from an organisation of its size and clout. But it would be to overstate the matter to suggest that BRAC focuses on service delivery to the exclusion of other, more deeply political structural issues. Underlying and informing BRAC's overall strategy has often been some grounded political analysis, although BRAC has never been known as a heavyweight in national governance debates. It has relatively recently entered the arena, however, with its Institute (formerly Centre) for Governance Studies, based at BRAC University, which has provided postgraduate training on governance and development to civil servants, as well as publishing the annual review, State of Governance in Bangladesh report series, since 2006. And in other ways BRAC's political analysis has had considerable influence, both within and beyond the organisation. 20
'Small may be beautiful, but big is necessary'
It is impossible to tell the BRAC story without resort to statistics: it is substantially a story of large numbers. A much-favoured dig of Abed, the founder/CEO of BRAC, is at Schumacher's 'small is beautiful'; this may be so, he is quoted as saying, 'but big is necessary'. There are more than 115,000 BRAC employees, including teachers, in Bangladesh alone. This excludes volunteers and para-professionals (who earn on the job) and around 6,000 staff working in the international programmes. The scale of BRAC's activities is hard to capture; a recent monograph had to skim lightly across decades of development work and new international programmes in order to be able to tell a coherent story (see Smillie 2009 Analysis of the factors behind the scale of BRAC's Bangladesh programme has centred on three aspects of the organisation: management, capacity development and innovation. A fourth, that of political space has to date, received less attention. We look now at each of these in turn. 
Management
Those familiar with the highly professional financial operations of BRAC will be unsurprised to learn that its founder, F.H. Abed, had been a private sector executive (Shell Oil) with a background in accountancy. Financial accountability has always been an organisational strength, and the practices of financial accountability have extended to strong systems of performance accountability throughout the organisation, notable for its tight internal controls and close monitoring mechanisms at every level (Zaman 2004) . 21 The organisation is audited internally and externally, and recently won a prize from CGAP at the World Bank for its financial transparency.
In their analysis of why microcredit programmes work so effectively, Jain and Moore conclude that while part of the answer lies in the nature of the service (homogenous, easily-quantifiable performance), two other factors matter: regular, close daily monitoring of fieldworkers, and encouraging good work performance by 'increasing the extent to which the staff identify with [the organisation] and its mission ' (2003: 19) . This management strategy of encouraging identification with the organisation's mission is clearly present in the BRAC case, and many of the features of effective microcredit programme management identified by Jain and Moore (2003) Celebrating organisational success (promotes staff identification with the mission)
'Campus'-style living field arrangements, preventing staff from feeling socially isolated, creating a relatively flat frontline management structure in which living conditions and rules apply equally across all staff, and creating peer pressure for performance and maintaining rules A strong emphasis on field visits by headquarters or senior management staff (Jain and Moore 2003: 19-20) . Despite strong monitoring systems for feeding quantitative performance indicators up to senior management, in BRAC management culture there is no substitute for field visits and grounded programme knowledge. In the authors' experience, regular field visits are unquestionably a core management activity. Even top-tier managers can often display a highly detailed knowledge, not only of the overall programme, but of individual programme beneficiaries and their circumstances.
There have been concerns about the governance of the big NGOs, including BRAC, in Bangladesh, including that many are hierarchical organisations lacking the space for direct staff participation or for accountability downward, to clients or members. A recent DPhil thesis explored these issues in relation to gender equity, and concluded that formal mechanisms for accountability to women members were more or less absent in BRAC. However, it also found that some staff was responsive to pressures for accountability informally, based on their social connections to clients or members. 22 
Staff capacity development
A second strength of the BRAC Bangladesh programme is in its staff capacity development strategy. BRAC and other NGOs do not pay high salaries compared to government or other private sector employment, nor are there significant material perks of the job. BRAC's strategy has been to invest substantially in training, including external training opportunities for high-performing staff (Smillie 2009 ). This is partly significant because much middle and senior management has come up through the ranks (ibid.). The issue of staff capacity development emerges prominently in discussion of the challenges facing BRAC's global expansion. The LeAD and DevPro training programmes have been geared towards building middle management capacity with this in mind. 24 BRAC managers explain that they are exploring new ways of attracting and retaining national staff in Tanzania and Uganda; these are labour markets in which people with education and professional experience are in greater demand than was the case in Bangladesh, with its large supply of the educated unemployed.
Innovation
In 1980, when there were only 378 BRAC staff members, David Korten was the first to identify a striking BRAC quality -that it is a 'learning organisation'. Korten noted an 'unusual capacity for rapid learning through the constant identification, acknowledgement, and correction of its own errors ' (1980: 488) . The theme was taken up and further developed in relation to the BRAC expansion by Catherine Lovell in 1992. Smillie and Hailey (2001) and Smillie (2009) reiterated the idea that BRAC as an organisation has an unusual capacity to innovate and adapt based on learning about what works. Capacity to learn is supported by the proximity of senior management to the ground, which enables senior managers and field staff to communicate constantly about what is working (or otherwise). In one of the present author's experience, it can be a source of some frustration for programme evaluation teams that programme designs change so fast and so seamlessly that this complicates any simple impact assessment model, based on assumptions of a stable programme design being implemented in pre-planned ways. By the time a programme hits the ground it is likely to have gone through several iterations since its original proposal.
Capacity to learn has also been supported by the long-standing support -and often critical perspective -afforded by the fact of an in-house research and evaluation division. BRAC-RED was established early on during BRAC Bangladesh's expansion, and has been viewed as one important factor in its learning, auto-evaluation, and its innovations. Again, learning, adaptation and innovation seem likely to be critical to how BRAC International approaches the new challenges.
Political space
BRAC and other large NGOs and MFIs were able to go to scale in Bangladesh partly because of the unusual freedom with which they were able to operate. The space for NGO services first opened up significantly during the Ershad military regime of , when donors, disappointed with the pace of progress on poverty reduction, began to push for more room for NGO activities (Barry 1988; Sanyal 1991) . The lack of tight regulation on microfinance was another critical dimension of this space (World Bank 2006; Zaman 2004) . The importance of the regulatory space has been brought home to BRAC in its efforts to expand microfinance activities in Africa, where regulations, particularly on savings services, are considerably tighter. 25 There is no shortage of domestic criticism of NGOs and microfinance. 26 Given the sustained public critique of NGOs, both from the political left (seeking a more radical strategy; see Hashemi and Hassan 1999) and the religious-political right (who clashed with NGOs over their adherence to Western cultural values in the early 1990s) it may be remarkable that NGO services have been able to expand as they have in Bangladesh. Certainly, national elite involvement and support in a context of abundant aid have helped to maintain a significant space open for NGOs (Hossain 2005) . This space has included a role in the provision of services for which there are strong arguments that the state should supply. This entails the critical 'franchise state' notion, in which the lines of accountability between citizen and state are blurred (Wood 1997 ).
The political space for NGOs raises questions of how governments of Bangladesh have come to accommodate these programmes -if we do not accept that donor pressure is absolute and that aid-dependent governments entirely lack agency. In this case, an unexplored question has been that of the degree of institutional 'fit' between government and BRAC (Houtzager 2005) . At the frontline, relationships between NGO staff and government officials can be functional and friendly (see White 1999) ; while at higher levels, the line is officially hostile, particularly in the populist critique of microfinance interest rates. But in practice, it seems more plausible to argue that BRAC and the Government of Bangladesh enjoy a reasonably good 'fit', institutionally. The relationship varies across sectors -strong partnerships in public health, pre-primary education and social protection, compared to enduring antagonism in primary education, for instance. But as noted above, within BRAC, the view has been that their role complements public services. It is interesting that in an effort to defend NGO service delivery activities, David Hulme drew on the example of BRAC: I have 'changed my spots' over the years... my concerns about NGOs undermining processes of public sector reform and state formation have reduced. For example, the concerns I had about BRAC substituting for the state in Bangladesh have evaporated. BRAC provides services that ideally I think the state should provide (primary education and basic health services) as well as services the private sector should provide (cash transmission and ISP services). However, I do not believe it is 'crowding out' the state or the market: there is plenty of unmet demand for such services if the public and/or private sectors in Bangladesh get their acts together. And the ideas, systems and staff of BRAC are resources on which the state and private sector can draw in the future. (Hulme 2008: 338) In at least some of its new countries, particularly those not experiencing post-conflict conditions, BRAC appears to have run up against the confines of the political space in which it must operate. These limits have included the obvious facts of the relatively tight microfinance regulatory regimes. But they also include the (compared to Bangladesh) narrower space for NGOs service delivery. This is not a space that BRAC is currently well-positioned to enlarge, as a new actor with markedly foreign (if not Northern) origins.
3 The challenges of going global
Adapting to new contexts: how important is 'Southernness'?
The single most striking aspect of BRAC's global adventure is the Southern identity of the new entrants. It is precisely because the management, both the senior operational management back in Dhaka and the frontline management in the new countries, are Bangladeshi, that the BRAC expansion merits attention. But in practice, how does this 'Southernness' play out in the key relationships that need to be forged, with communities, national staff, aid donors, national civil society and government actors? It may be too soon to judge this issue; only the Afghanistan programme has been in place longer than five years. But a number of issues emerge as of interest, keeping in mind the analysis above of the elements of BRAC's expansion in Bangladesh.
One is that Bangladeshi BRAC staff do not receive what are by local standards, high international NGO salaries. They are paid twice what they would earn in Bangladesh, as well as modest expenses, a total which could not amount to half the salary of a UK-based international NGO. Nor does BRAC follow the stringent and costly security rules of other international actors, such as the UN system or international NGOs. Part of the reasoning behind this is that Bangladeshi aid workers are less obvious targets, even in Africa where they are racially distinct, than white aid workers would be. This is one reason BRAC offers to explain their success in establishing non-formal education programmes in the Internally Displaced Persons camps in northern Uganda, where other NGOs appear to have been unable or unwilling to base programmes.
All of this entails that BRAC staff rarely live amongst or socialise much with other actors within this system, with the possibility that this may curtail their acceptance within civil society and policy spaces. The 'Southern salary' advantages are not purely those of cost-effectiveness, however; it is possible that the smaller economic distance between Bangladeshi staff and the communities in which they work may bring the managerial advantages of closer contact with beneficiaries. That many Bangladeshi BRAC International staff speak limited English also matters with respect to how they engage at the centre; it is interesting that this is not a prominent concern for BRAC management, who consider it more important for their International staff to learn local languages than English: in Afghanistan, Bangladeshis tend to learn Dari (which has similarities to Bangla), and French language training is also being considered, with the planned Haiti expansion in mind.
Second, the implications of campus-style living arrangements, a core feature of the BRAC frontline office set-up, may differ when there are relations between national staff and their Bangladeshi managers to take into account. It will be instructive to see how the transplanted arrangement fares if national and Bangladeshi staff live and eat separately, 27 and whether they retain their management and organisational cultural benefits when marked with cultural difference (Jain and Moore 2003) . These are issues that BRAC management appear to be considering while they experiment with adaptations to the new contexts.
Third is the possibility that solidarity around the shared experience of 'Southernness' will lead to different ways of relating. 
The end of alternatives? New ideologies of action
With the caveat that much remains to be seen, BRAC's global expansion challenges expectation in a context of gloom about NGOs and the 'alternatives' they were once believed to promise (see Bebbington et al. 2007; Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 2006; Lewis and Kanji 2009 ). There are two distinct strands to the 'disappointment' theme. The first is declining interest in NGOs (and civil society more generally) among aid donors, partly brought about by a stronger focus on the state resulting from good governance, security, and aid coordination agendas (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 2006; Howell et al. 2006) . The second is disappointment with the apparent failure of NGOs to engage in radical transformative action to deliver positive social change (Bebbington et al. 2008; Tvedt 2002 Tvedt , 2006 . This includes an increasing homogeneity of language and approach across NGOs, signalling a decline in local innovation and ownership of the agenda (Mawdsley et al. 2002) . The role of NGOs in supporting neoliberalist economic agendas, particularly through service delivery activities believed to undermine political accountability between states and citizens, is an important element to this discussion (Tvedt 2002 (Tvedt , 2006 .
Against this backdrop, BRAC's ambition contrasts with the strong sense that far from being 'magic bullets', NGOs have 'hit a wall ' (Bebbington et al. 2008 , in the introduction to the latest of the Manchester NGO Conference books). Nevertheless, BRAC International does appear to have run up against the new coldness of aid donors towards NGOs. And while there may be a global sharing of development discourse, this has served BRAC only partially; the way matters have been viewed in Bangladesh is (inevitably) not how they are viewed in Uganda or Tanzania. The differences have been material, for BRAC's capacity to attract relatively low transaction cost, large-scale bilateral grant financing. In other words, national context continues to matter greatly, despite the structuring power of the international aid system. As Tvedt puts it, these are 'internationalised national traditions and... nationalised international institutions and ideas' (Tvedt 2006: 685) : the globalisation of aid discourses and practices only goes so far in penetrating national institutions, and international institutions and practices are effectively domesticated in the countries in which they operate.
BRAC is certainly different from other big international NGOs, but it does not represent an 'alternative' in the tradition of radical, transformative struggles against structures of power that impoverish and oppress. BRAC does envisage a long-term engagement in the countries in which it works, seeing its role as in 'development', or deep processes of social, political and economic change, and not as the narrower 'Development' of aid interventions (Bebbington et al. 2008) . This sense of engaging with long-term processes may help to explain why the challenges BRAC International currently faces are cast as teething problems; the perspective is not one of successful projects, but one of building frontline organisations that can deliver services. This long-term engagement in service delivery means that questions of political accountability will inevitably arise. While there are reasons to believe that in Bangladesh, at least, the impact of BRAC services has not been to undermine accountability, the new contexts mean the question merits revisiting (see Lewis and Kanji 2009 for an up-to-date review of the debates about NGO service delivery).
In its adaptive strategy, BRAC has begun to position itself as 'social enterprise', as distinct from an 'NGO' (although the term is not being abandoned This repositioning as social enterprise is involving a considerable amount of communications work; arguably for the first time, a BRAC entity is taking on public relations in a serious way. BRAC USA plans to draw on its prominent supporters to raise awareness about BRAC's work around the world. One idea is for the Buffetts (who are supporters through the Buffett Foundation) to send a copy of Ian Smillie's book Freedom From Want to 100 influential people, to include the US President and celebrities. With respect to the question of 'alternatives' it is worth noting that while the idea of 'social enterprise' involves an ideological shift to the right from the perspective of a radical NGO social mobilisation agenda, within the US it is a more progressive notion emerging out of the non-profit world, which explicitly aims to build solidarity between the global South and the North.
The aid regime
It seems likely that BRAC's Southernness has also affected its capacity to mobilise aid in the new countries. That BRAC's reputation and brand have not preceded it into the aid circles of the new countries is a matter of some surprise and disappointment for BRAC management; it highlights, too, the incomplete nature of the 'transnationality' of aid to NGOs in development (Mawdsley et al. 2002) . The Deputy Executive Director with responsibility for African programmes felt that they were often an unknown quantity, and that within aid agencies, knowledge of BRAC in Bangladesh and Afghanistan had not spread. Many aid donors in the new countries, he said 'seem to think we are stupid... or arrogant', 31 unaccustomed to requests for amounts like US$50 million, for what they view as the untested programme of an unknown NGO. While no specific instance could be given, the overall low profile of BRAC as an international actor is likely to reflect its Southern origins. This low international profile seems to be part of the reason for the current branding exercise: the Dhaka Head Office has recently recruited a brand manager, and Nike provided some branding support in 2007 (BRAC 2009).
Bilateral aid to service-delivery NGO programmes appears to be less easily available to BRAC outside of Bangladesh than their domestic experience had led them to believe might be the case. when senior managers are occupied with teething problems on the ground. Aid to service-delivery NGOs in Bangladesh has probably been more significant than in other countries, other than those in post-conflict conditions, so that BRAC's expectations of bilateral aid may never have been realistic. The Paris Agenda, particularly the move towards sectoral approaches, and the emphasis on NGOs as civil society actors rather than service delivery agents (which has been relatively muted in Bangladesh) have contributed to these challenges.
While BRAC's profile has proven to be surprisingly low among aid donors in the new countries, central political figures and government actors in the new countries appear to have more knowledge of and interest in BRAC programmes than had been anticipated. There have been some high-level government visits to BRAC Bangladesh from powerful people in a number of the new countries, as well as from the Gandhi dynasty. Despite this interest, the strategic focus has remained on concentrating efforts and personnel on the ground, rather than on (as one possible element of an expansionary strategy) cultivating a supportive constituency at the centre.
There is a sense that BRAC can gain entry into contexts in which other international NGOs, perhaps with prominent concerns about human rights, may not wish or be invited to enter: Sri Lanka is one such example. Not seeking direct political influence at the centre, neither being so constrained by security concerns, BRAC may find it easier to work in some of these sensitive political environments. Here again, there are parallels with Chinese engagement, with its 'older rhetoric of third world solidarity' and its Africa Policy 'premised on respect for sovereignty and "non-interference" in national political processes ' (Power and Mohan 2008: 34) .
The Southernness of BRAC International is relevant to thinking about power relations among NGOs, as international NGOs (possibly increasingly) behave as brokers of aid for smaller Southern NGOs. To date, the 'international NGO' has referred to large Northern-based organisations (McIlwaine 2007); these have enjoyed good access to official aid flows, particularly bilaterally, which is channelled to 'partner' local NGOs in developing countries. Some within the NGO world, both Southern and Northern, see this relationship as entailing that international NGOs increasingly behave like bilateral aid donors (Bebbington et al. 2008: 17) . While the BRAC expansion model does not rely on such partnerships, it does set up new hierarchical relationships between culturally and racially distinct sets of actors. If we think of organisations like BRAC engaged in a competitive market for service delivery within Tvedt's DOSTANGO (donor-state-NGO) system, its expansion makes more sense. BRAC's social mission is layered on a platform of economic development and service delivery, at the frontline quite literally anchored within the infrastructure of microfinance. This is what makes it economical to reach so many with social services. Its ambitions of scale are another feature of BRAC's distinctiveness: the core BRAC philosophy is that is just not enough to do something useful on a small scale. And because it is necessary to be big, it becomes necessary to be businesslike in the service delivery market. One challenge for BRAC's expansion is that while concerns about the impact of NGO service delivery on public accountability have to some extent been allayed or neutralised in Bangladesh, the situation is different elsewhere. Very recently, BRAC's response has included a perceptible shift towards the language of 'rights-based approaches, with a focus on "enforceable rights" of access to resources' (BRAC 2009: 12-13 ).
Whether BRAC is merely different, rather than 'alternative', and the challenges it faces in carving out a space and securing financing for its expansion are issues rooted in its distinctive Southernness. The paper makes an initial survey of the ways in which BRAC's Southern origins seems to have shaped its global adventure. For reasons of focus and the lack of evidence, it unfortunately leaves untouched issues of frontline relations among Bangladeshi and national staff, the communities in which they work, and the local political and civil society context in which they operate; these will have to be the focus of future research. The paper does begin to sketch ways in which BRAC's distinctive Southernness introduces new dimensions to aid relationships; but the importance of this difference, and the advantages it may bring, are at times overshadowed by the material impacts of the aid regime. As BRAC reshapes itself to enter new non-profit markets as social enterprise, it is partly repositioning itself to frame its Southernness as a core advantage. If, as has been suggested by this review, BRAC International represents a trend towards South-South exchanges within development cooperation, it will continue to be of interest to see how this newest animal in the aid jungle fares.
